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On Modeling Risk Shocks
Abstract
Within the context of a nancial accelerator model, we model time-varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks)
through the use of a mixture Normal model with time variation in the weights applied to the underlying
distributions characterizing entrepreneur productivity. Specically, we model capital producers (i.e. the
entrepreneurs) as either low-risk (relatively small second moment for productivity) and high-risk (relatively
large second moment for productivity) and the fraction of both types is time-varying. We show that a
small change in the fraction of risky types (a change from 1% to 2% of the population) can result in a
large quantitative eect or a risk shock relative to standard models. The bankruptcy rate and the risk
premium in the economy are very sensitive to a change in the composition of agents and is countercyclical.
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1 Introduction
A better understanding of the eects of time varying uncertainty, motivated in no small part
by recent economic events as well as improvements in numerical methods, has become the goal
of much recent research in macroeconomics. An example of this literature is Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2014) in which they nd that changes in productivity uncertainty, which the
authors characterize as risk shocks, are the dominant source of shocks in the Euro area and,
in the U.S., are second only to an aggregate technology shock in accounting for business cycle
volatility.1 Another example is that of Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2012) in
which, using a dierent empirical strategy, they also demonstrate the countercyclical nature of risk
shocks; the authors then construct a model with heterogeneous rms consistent with many of the
observed features. Unlike the aforementioned papers, Jurado, Ludvingson and Ng (2015), however,
show their estimate of time varying macroeconomic uncertainty occurs less frequently and delivers
quantitatively unimportant uncertainty episodes than stated by other existing uncertainty proxies.
But, Jurado et al (2015) also show that when these infrequent uncertainty events do occur then
they are large, more persistent, and are more correlated with real activity.
While this burgeoning literature on time-varying uncertainty explores dierent amplication
and propagation mechanisms, a common theme is that a risk shock is characterized as a second
moment shock, i.e. as a mean-preserving spread in some distribution (typically that describing
rms' productivity shocks). Figure 1, however, shows the Quantile-Quantile plots of four dierent
uncertainty (risk) shocks2 with clear skewness and kurtosis eects.
In this paper, we thus present a richer characterization of risk (uncertainty) by introducing
two types of rms (low and high risk) so that the aggregate cumulative density function for
1 Some other papers which examine the eects of time varying uncertainty are: Bloom (2009) identies 17
uncertain periods using the VIX. Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012) examine time varying uncertainty with a focus
on the recent nancial crisis. Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer, (2014) examine the eects of risk shocks in a model of
housing production. Using rm level data, Chugh (2014) nds that the quantitative eects of risk shocks, when
model is estimated using micro data, to be quite small. Bachman and Bayer (2012) also use rm level data and
nd that the quantitative eects of risk shocks are small.
2 Four uncertainty measures are Bloom (2009) for VIX, Bloom et al (2012) for rm productivity, Dorofeenko et
al (2014) for construction industry, and Jurado et al (2015) for macroeconomic variables.
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Figure 1: Quantile-Quantile Plots for Uncertainty Measures vs Normal Distribution (2001:4-
2014:1)
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rm productivity shocks is a mixture density. Consequently, we demonstrate that not only the
second moment but also the third (skewness) and the fourth (kurtosis) moments play a signicant
role in explaining the large quantitative eects of risk shocks.3 In doing so, our objective is to
further support the existing evidence that changes in uncertainty are quantitatively important
(sometimes) and to provide some basis (a model) for how this time varying uncertainty comes
about.
Our model framework is that of Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008)| henceforth, DLS |
who analyze the importance of risk shocks in the nancial accelerator model of Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997). But we depart from the DLS framework by adding additional heterogeneity in the
entrepreneur section and introducing time-varying uncertainty by treating the fraction of agent
3 There are a few recent papers which analyse the higher moment eects on aggregate output. For example,
Atalay and Drautzburg (2015) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) look at the contribution of
industries' shocks to aggregate output and employment tail risks. Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan and Song (2015),
analyse the higher moment eects of earning shocks.
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types as time-varying. The main result of this analysis is that a small absolute change in the
fraction of risky agents (a change from 1% of the population to 2%) has large quantitative eects
for rm bankruptcy and the risk premium associated with bank loans. In addition, as in DLS, an
increase in the number of risky agents results in a countercyclical bankruptcy rate as observed in
the data in contrast to the behavior in the original Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model.
2 Model
As our model departs from the DLS framework by adding heterogeneity in the entrepreneur
section, the model description presented here will be brief but nevertheless self-contained. (A
complete description of the model is provided in the Appendix.)
The model is a variant of a standard RBC model in which an additional production sector
is added. This sector produces capital using a technology which transforms investment into
capital. In a standard RBC framework, this conversion is always one-to-one; in the Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) "investment model" framework, the production technology is subject to technology
shocks. (The aggregate production technology is also subject to technology shocks as is standard.)
Specically, letting it denote investment, the production function for new capital is given by the
linear relationship !tit where !t is the technology shock. The capital production sector is owned
by risk-neutral entrepreneurs who nance their production via loans from a risk neutral nancial
intermediation sector - this lending channel is characterized by a loan contract with a xed interest
rate. (Both capital production and the loans are intra-period.) If a capital producing rm realizes
a low technology shock , the rm will declare bankruptcy and the nancial intermediary will
take over production; this activity is subject to monitoring costs which reduces aggregate capital
production.
To this scenario, unlike in the DLS model, we introduce heterogeneity by assuming that there
exists two types of entrepreneurs in the economy: a risky type with c:d:f:for the technology
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shock aecting capital production given by  (!;1) and a normal (i.e. low-risk) entrepreneur
with c:d:f:for the technology shock aecting capital production given by  (!;2) where 1 > 2
and i denotes the standard deviation for entrepreneur i: For both types of entrepreneurs, it is
assumed that ! is normally distributed with the mean of the technology shock equal to unity;
i.e. E (!) = 1: Uncertainty is introduced by assuming that the probability of being a risky
type, denoted pt, is a random variable where pt 2 (0; 1) : (Given the assumption that there are a
continuum of entrepreneurs distributed on the unit interval, pt also denotes the fraction of risky
entrepreneurs.) It is assumed that banks and entrepreneurs observe pt but entrepreneurs do not
know their type; this is observed when the value of !t is revealed. As a consequence, lending
contracts can not be written conditional on i: (Aside from the distribution of technology shocks,
all entrepreneurs are identical and, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), are assumed to be risk
neutral with preferences over consumption and leisure.)
This description implies that the c:d:f: relevant for both lenders (i.e. banks) and borrowers
(i.e. entrepreneurs) is a mixture model given by:
m (!; pt) = pt (!;1) + (1  pt)  (!;2) (1)
An appealing feature of a mixture model is that the linear combination of two normal distributions
results in a distribution with much greater kurtosis and skewness4 than implied by normality.5 In
previous research, risk shocks have been characterized solely in terms of second moments6 but the
4 The explicit formulas for skewness and kurtosis of the mixture model are as follows: Skewness:
p
 
21 + 3

41 + (1  p)
 
22 + 3

42 
p21 + (1  p)
2
2

3=2
Kurtosis:
p
 
81 + 6
6
1 + 15
4
1 + 16
2
1 + 3

41+
(1  p)
 
82 + 6
6
2 + 15
4
2 + 16
2
2 + 3

42 
p21 + (1  p)
2
2

2
 3
5 It is well-known in the nance literature that nancial returns exhibit more extreme observations than would
be predictedby the normal or Gaussian distribution: that is, nancial returns have fat tails. Since Mandelbrot
(1963) highlighted the issue, the most if not all the VaR (value at risk) analysis employ various distributions that
display fat tails.
6 Some of the proposed measures of uncertainty in the literature are the nancial market uncertainty by Bloom
(2009), the policy uncertainty measure by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013), and the macro uncertainty measure by
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mixture model, as presented here, provides a richer characterization of increased risk. Moreover,
even though we employ linearization methods to solve the model, increased risk in the mixture
model can produce relatively large quantitative responses in the model.
As stated above, all other features of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model are the same. In
particular, the timing of events within a time-period is as follows:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks and fraction of risky agents, denoted (t; pt),
is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce output
via an aggregate production function.
3. Households make their labor, consumption and savings/investment decisions. The household
transfers qt consumption goods to the banking sector for each unit of investment.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to entrepreneurs
via the optimal nancial contract. The contract is dened by the size of the loan (it) and
a cuto level of productivity for the entrepreneurs technology shock, !t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector as inputs into their
capital-creation technology.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If !j;t  !t the en-
trepreneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost of it.
7. Entrepreneurs that are solvent make consumption choices; these in part determine their net
worth for the next period.
We now focus on the lending contract and the role of time varying uncertainty.
Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). See for example Bloom (2014) for the recent literature overview.
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2.1 Optimal Financial Contract
The optimal nancial contract between entrepreneur and lender is described by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997). But for expository purposes as well as to explain our approach in addressing the
eect of greater risk on equilibrium, we briey outline the model. In deriving the optimal contract,
both entrepreneurs and lenders take the price of capital, qt, and net worth, nt, as given.
As described above, the entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms it
units of consumption into !tit units of capital. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), the technology
shock !t was assumed to be distributed as i:i:d. with E (!t) = 1. In contrast, here the relevant
c:d:f:for both lender and entrepreneur, m (!; pt) ; is given by the mixture model as dened in eq.
(1); we denote the associated p:d:f: as m (!; pt). It is assumed that the fraction of risky agents,
pt, following process
7:
pt = p0 exp (ut) (2)
where ut = uut 1 + u;t; u;t~N (0; u). To keep the value of pt in the interval [0; 1], the
distribution of shocks should be truncated from above ut  um. One can show that um then
should satisfy the inequality um  log
 
p 10

. The unconditional mean of the fraction of risky
agents is given by p. While the current value of pt is known by all agents, the realization of !t is
privately observed by the entrepreneur; banks can observe the realization at a cost of it units of
consumption.
The entrepreneur enters period t with one unit of labor endowment and zt units of capital.
Labor is supplied inelastically while capital is rented to rms at the rental rate rt, hence income in
the period is wt + rtzt: This income along with remaining capital determines net worth (denoted
as nt and denominated in units of consumption) at time t:
nt = wt + zt (rt + qt (1  )) (3)
7 For the calibration exercise, we scale ut so that 1% increase in ut translates into 1% increase in pt:
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With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (it   nt) consumption goods and agrees
to pay back
 
1 + rk

(it   nt) capital goods to the lender, where r
k
t is the interest rate on loans.
Thus, the entrepreneur defaults on the loan if his realization of output is less then the re-payment,
i.e.
!t <
 
1 + rkt

(it   nt)
it
 !t (4)
The optimal borrowing contract is given by the pair (it; !t) that maximizes entrepreneur's
return subject to the lender's willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). The
optimum is determined by the solution to:
max
fi;!g
qtitfm (!t; pt) subject to qtitgm (!t; pt)  (it   nt)
where
fm (!t; pt) = pt
Z 1
!t
! (!;1) d! + (1  pt)
Z 1
!t
! (!;2) d!   [1  m (!t; pt)] !t (5)
which can be interpreted as the fraction of the expected net capital output received by the en-
trepreneur. Note that the rst two terms represent the expected fraction of capital received by
the entrepreneur if solvent while the last term represents the interest payment weighted by the
probability of being solvent (where the relevant c:d:f:is m (!; pt) :) The function gm (!t; pt) is
the corresponding fraction of the expected net capital output received by the lender and is given
by:
gm (!t; pt) = pt
Z !t
 1
! (!;1) d!+(1  pt)
Z !t
 1
! (!;2) d!+[1  m (!t; pt)] !t m (!t; pt)
(6)
The last term represents the expected fraction of capital lost due to monitoring costs. Specically,
note that fm (!t; pt) + gm (!t; pt) = 1  m (!t; pt): the right hand side is the average amount
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of capital produced per unit of investment. This is split between entrepreneurs and lenders while
monitoring costs reduce net capital production.
The necessary conditions for the optimal contract problem are
@ (:)
@!
: qtit
@fm (!t; pt)
@!
=  tqtit
@gm (!t; pt)
@!
(7)
where t is the shadow price associated with the lender's resources.
The second necessary condition is:
@ (:)
@it
: qtfm (!t; pt) =  t [1  qtgm (!t; pt)] (8)
Solving for q using the rst order conditions, we have:
q 1t =
"
(fm (!t; pt) + gm (!t; pt)) +
m (!t; pt)fm (!t; pt)
@fm(!t;pt)
@!
#
(9)
=
"
1  m (!t; pt)+
m (!t; pt)fm (!t; pt)
@fm(!t;pt)
@!
#
 [1 D (!t; pt)]
where D (!t; pt) can be thought of as the total default costs.
It is straightforward to show that equation (9) denes an implicit function ! (qt; pt) that is
increasing in qt. Also note that, in equilibrium, the price of capital, qt, diers from unity due to
the presence of the credit market frictions. (Note that @fm(!t;pt)
@! = m (!t; pt)  1 < 0.)
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
it =
1
(1  qtg (!t; pt))
nt (10)
Equation (10) implies that investment is linear in net worth and denes a function that represents
the amount of consumption goods placed in to the capital technology: i (qt; nt; pt). The fact that
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the function is linear implies that the aggregate investment function is well dened.
The eect of an increase in uncertainty on investment in this model can be understood by
rst turning to eq. (9). Under the assumption that the price of capital is unchanged, this implies
that the costs of default, represented in the function D (!t; pt), must also be unchanged. While
more general, an increase in pt is similar to a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for !t,
this implies that !t must fall to keep D (!t; pt) constant. It is shown in Dorofeenko, Lee, Salyer
(2008) through an approximation analysis that gm ()  !t so that the fall in !t results in a fall
in the expected capital return to entrepreneurs. Using the incentive compatibility constraint,
qtgm (!t; pt) = 1 
nt
it
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in it. As demonstrated below, the quantitative response
of investment due to an increase in the fraction of risky agents is high relative to a simpler model
in which a risk shock is associated with a mean preserving spread (a change in the second moment
only).
2.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the economy is represented by market clearing in the labor and goods markets. (A
complete description of the economy is provided in the Appendix.) Letting (Ht;H
e
t ) denote the
aggregate labor supply of, respectively households and entrepreneurs, we have
Ht = (1  ) lt (11)
where lt denotes labor supply of households and  denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
economy.
Het =  (12)
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Goods market equilibrium is represented by
Ct + It = Yt (13)
where Ct = (1  ) ct + c
e
t and It = it: (Note upper case variables denotes aggregate quantities
while lower case denote per-capita quantities.)
The law of motion of aggregate capital is given by:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It [1  m (!t; pt)] (14)
A competitive equilibrium is dened by the decision rules for (aggregate capital, entrepreneurs
capital, household labor, entrepreneur's labor, the price of capital, entrepreneur's net worth, in-
vestment, the cuto productivity level, household consumption, and entrepreneur's consumption)
given by the vector: fKt+1; Zt+1;Ht;H
e
t ; qt; nt; it; !t; ct; c
e
tg where these decision rules are station-
ary functions of fKt; Zt; t; ptg and satisfy the following equations:
ct = H
Yt
Ht
(15)
qt
ct
= Et

1
ct+1

qt+1 (1  ) + K
Yt+1
Kt+1

(16)
qt =
(
1  m (!t; pt)+
m (!; pt)fm (!t; pt)
@fm(!t;pt)
@!
) 1
(17)
it =
1
(1  qtgm (!t; pt))
nt (18)
qt = Et

qt+1 (1  ) + K
Yt+1
Kt+1

qt+1fm (!t; pt)
(1  qt+1gm (!t; pt))

(19)
nt = He
Yt
Het
+ Zt

qt (1  ) + K
Yt
Kt

(20)
Zt+1 = nt

fm (!t; pt)
1  qtgm (!t; pt)

  
cet
qt
(21)
t+1 = 

t t+1 where t  i:i:d: with E (t) = 1 (22)
pt = p0 exp (ut) where ut = uut 1 + u;t; u;t~N (0; u) (23)
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The rst equation represents the labor-leisure choice for households while the second equation
is the necessary condition associated with household's savings decision. The third and fourth
equation are from the optimal lending contract while the fth equation is the necessary condition
associated with entrepreneur's savings decision. The sixth equation is the determination of net
worth while the seventh gives the evolution of entrepreneur's capital. (The evolution of aggregate
capital is given in eq. (14)). The nal two equations represent the laws of motion for the aggregate
technology and fraction of risky agents respectively.
3 Equilibrium Characteristics
3.1 Calibration
For this analysis, we use, to a large extent, the parameters employed in Carlstrom and Fuerst's
(1997) and DLS analysis. Specically, the following parameter values are used:
Table 1: Parameter Values
    
0.99 0.36 0.02 0.95 0.25
Agents discount factor, the depreciation rate and capital's share are fairly standard in RBC
analysis. In addition, the aggregate technology shock is assumed to follow a standard AR(1)
process with autoregressive parameter of 0:95: The remaining parameter, , represents the moni-
toring costs associated with bankruptcy. This value, as noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is
relatively prudent given estimates of bankruptcy costs (which range from 20% (Altman (1984) to
36% (Alderson and Betker (1995) of rm assets).
In order to calibrate the parameters of the mixture model (i.e.. (1; 2; p), we choose the pa-
rameters so that the implied steady-state bankruptcy rate and annual risk premium on loans(both
terms are dened below) are consistent with U.S. data. In particular we use the following values
from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997): a bankruptcy rate of 0.974% (per quarter) and an annual risk
11
premium of 187 basis points. We assume throughout that the average fraction of risky agents (p)
is equal to 1%.
Let the steady-state bankruptcy rate be denoted as br and !^ denote the steady-state level
of !t: The steady-state bankruptcy rate is given by the mixture c:d:f: evaluated at the cuto
productivity level. That is, we require:
m (!^; p) = br = 0:00974 (24)
All loans in the economy are intra-period so the (gross) risk-free rate is, by denition, equal
to unity. Hence, the gross interest rate (dened in terms of consumption goods) associated with
the bank loan can also be thought of as the risk premium on bank loans. We denote this risk
premium as ; in steady-state, it is given by (see eq.(4)):
 = q!^
{
{  n
(25)
But the incentive compatibility constraint (eq.(18)) implies that, in steady-state:
n
{
= 1  qg (!^; p) (26)
Using this in eq. (25) yields the second restriction (the frequency of the model is assumed to be
quarterly):
 =
!^
g (!^; p)
=
0:0187
4
(27)
With p assumed to be 1%; these two equations dene an implicit function 2 (1). Numerically
solving for this function results in the relationship depicted in Figure 2.Note that in the original
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model, the standard deviation of technology shocks was calibrated
(using the same empirical strategy given above) to be equal to 0:207. That explains the starting
12
Figure 2: 1 as a function of 2
value for the graph in which 1 = 2 = 0:207: Then as the standard deviation of the risky
agents increases, the low risk agents' standard deviation must be adjusted downward so that the
model remains consistent with the observed bankruptcy rate and risk premium on loans. Figure
3 shows the corresponding skewness and excess kurtosis values for the mixed Normal distribution
m (!; pt) when 1 changes: Both skewness and kurtosis remain close to the values for a Normal
distribution until 1 reaches 0.6. At the limit value for 1 = 0:643, the value for kurtosis changes
dramatically to 465.2: these large changes both in skewness and kurtosis are the base for the
empirical results that we obtain in this paper.
For our empirical analysis, we examine two economies that dier in the degree of riskiness of
the two types of agents. In Economy 1, we assume that the standard deviation of the high risk
agents is roughly 2.5 times that of the low risk agents. Specically, it is assumed that 1 = 0:52
implying that 2 = 0:191:
8 In Economy 2, we examine a more extreme case in which standard
deviation of risky agent 1 = 0:642 while the low risk agents' standard deviation 2 = 0:052. That
is, the high risk agents' standard deviation is roughly 12 times larger than that of the low risk
agents. While this is dramatic, it is important to keep in mind that the high risk agents are only
8 As 1 = 0:52 leads to the kurtosis value of 6.96, which is close to the value of 6.75 that has been reported in
Jurado, et al (2015), we take 1 = 0:52 to represent Economy 1.
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Figure 3: Skewness and Kurtosis with changes in 1 (holding p = 0.01)
Corresponding (σ1: skewness)
(0.207:0.64), (0.52:0.87), (0.643:10.4)
Corresponding (σ1: Kurtosis)
(0.207: 0.73), (0.52:6.96), (0.643:465.2)
1% of the population of entrepreneurs.
The eect of greater uncertainty as represented by economy II (1 = 0:642; 2 = 0:052) in
the capital production sector is seen in Table 2. (All values in Table 2 are percentage changes
relative to the Carlstrom and Fuerst economy. i.e. 1 = 2 = 0:207). Consistent with the partial
equilibrium analysis presented earlier, a mean-preserving spread in entrepreneur's shock causes
the price of capital (q) to increase and steady-state capital to fall. This also implies a decrease in
consumption, a slight increase in steady-state labor, and a fall in steady-state output.
14
Table 2: Steady-State Eects of Greater Uncertainty (1 = 0:642; 2 = 0:052)
(comparison to Carlstrom & Fuerst Economy: 1 = 2 = 0:207)
variable Economy II
c -0.64
k -1.79
h 0.00
y -0.64
q 1.13
3.2 Cyclical Behavior
As described in Section 2, eqs. (15) through (23) determine the equilibrium properties of the
economy. To analyze the cyclical properties of the economy, we linearize (i.e. take a rst-order
Taylor series expansion) of these equations around the steady-state values and express all terms
as percentage deviations from steady-state values. This numerical approximation method is
standard in quantitative macroeconomics. What is not standard in this model is that the higher
moments of technology shocks aecting the capital production sector for both risky and non-risky
entrepreneurs, in particular the kurtosis of the mixture distribution, will inuence equilibrium
behavior and, therefore, the equilibrium policy rules. Linearizing the equilibrium conditions
around the steady-state typically imposes certainty equivalence so that only the rst moment
matters. In this model, however, the higher moments of the entrepreneur's technology shock
continue to inuence the economy through their role in determining lending activities and, in
particular, the nature of the lending contract. Linearizing the system of equilibrium conditions
does not eliminate that role in this economy and, hence, we think that this is an attractive feature
of the model.
In Table 3, a few key second moments of the economies are reported along with the correspond-
ing moments in the data. (In producing the articial data, both economies were subject to an
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aggregate technology shock as well as the stochastic variation in the composition of risky agents.)
Note that the behavior of the real side of the economy, as represented in the second moments,
is fairly invariant to the composition of the risky agents. Hence, the aggregate technology shock
continues to be the primary determinant of the real sector of the economy. However, as seen below,
the nancial sector variables are highly sensitive to the changes in uncertainty that includes both
skewness and kurtosis in the economy. These eects can rst be seen in Figure 4 that shows the
share of risky entrepreneur contributing to the total bankruptcy rate in the economy: When risky
entrepreneurs'  take the value of 0:6 then the total bankruptcy rate in the economy is caused by
40% of risky entrepreneurs, which is 0:4% (since p is set at 1%)of the total population.
Figure 4: Share of Risky Entrepreneurs for Total Skewness, Kurtosis and Bankruptcy Rate with
changes in 1 (holding p = 0.01)
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The impulse response functions in Figures 5 to 7 also conrm the aforementioned eects to
which we now turn. We rst examine aggregate output, household consumption and investment;
the impulse response functions for a 1% innovation to the technology shock and the percentage of
risky agents are given in Figure 5. The responses to technology shocks are well understood while
Figure 5: Response of Output, Consumption and Investment to 1% changes in Aggregate tech-
nology ( = 0.207) and the fraction of risky entrepreneurs (1% to 2%) for risky entrepreneur's
variance ( = 0.52)
the responses to greater uncertainty are best viewed through the lens of the returns to investment.
With greater uncertainty as represented by an increase in the fraction of risky entrepreneurs, the
bankruptcy rate increases in the economy (see Figure 7), which implies that agency costs increase.
This implies that the rate of return on investment for the economy therefore falls. Households,
in response, reduce investment and increase consumption and leisure. The latter response causes
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output to fall. While these eects are qualitatively interesting, it is clear that, quantitatively,
the eects of changes in uncertainty are relatively small compare to the eects of the aggregate
technology shock. Figure 6 presents the response of the entrepreneur's consumption and net worth.
Again, the quantitative impact of the technology shock is much larger than that of a change in
the number of risky agents.
Figure 6: Response of Entrepreneur Consumption and Entrepreneur Net Worth to 1% changes in
Aggregate technology ( = 0.207) and the fraction of risky entrepreneurs (1% to 2%) for risky
entrepreneur's variance ( = 0.52)
This small quantitative eects on aggregate variables are, however, overturned for the lending
channel variables as seen in Figure 7 which presents the responses of the risk premium and the
bankruptcy rate to a 1% change in the aggregate technology shock and an absolute 1% change
in the percentage of risky entrepreneurs shock (i.e. from 1% of the population to 2%). For the
sake of comparison, we also present the response to a standard risk shock as studied in DLS (and
is the typical characterization in the risk shocks literature) in which there is 1% change in the
standard deviation of the distribution for the entrepreneur's technology shock.9 As seen in Figure
9 For the 1 values for "; "p; and " are 0.207, 0.52 and 0.207 respectively.
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Figure 7: Response of Risk Premium and Bankruptcy Rate to 1% changes in Aggregate technology
( = 0.207), the fraction of risky entrepreneurs (1% to 2%) for risky entrepreneur's variance (
= 0.52), and uncertainty in DLS for entrepreneur's variance ( = 0.207)
7, time variation in the composition of risky and non-risky agents has the most dramatic eect
on the risk premium associated with bank loans and the bankruptcy rate. For instance, when
the standard deviation of the risky agents' technology shock is little over two times larger than
that in the basic (i.e. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)) model (1 = 0:52 vs 1 = 0:207), the risk
premium on bank loans increases by roughly 30 basis points when the percentage of risky agents
increases from 1% to 2%; in the standard model, a 1% risk shock leads to roughly 14 basis point
increase. Moreover, the eect of the percentage of risky agents increases from 1% to 2% dominates
the eects of aggregate technology shock (i.e. an increase of roughly 30 percent compares to 24
percent). Similarly, in the same economy the change in the bankruptcy rate due to an increase
in risky agents is roughly 2 times that caused by a risk shock in the standard model and almost
same as that caused by a 1% change in the technology shock. We view these relatively large
quantitative responses as suggestive that further investigation of our modeling of risk shocks is
merited.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Characteristics10
Volatility relative to y Correlation with y
shocks11 y c h i k c h i k
Economy 1(1 = 0:52) 0.046 0.52 0.74 3.16 0.76 0.69 0.87 0.93 0.40
Economy 2(1 = 0:64) 0.046 0.53 0.73 3.19 0.80 0.71 0.86 0.93 0.40
shocks: only t (tech shock)
Economy 1(1 = 0:52) 0.046 0.51 0.74 3.17 0.76 0.69 0.87 0.93 0.39
Economy 2(1 = 0:64) 0.046 0.52 0.73 3.20 0.75 0.71 0.86 0.93 0.38
US data12 2.04 0.47 0.91 4.03 0.38 0.78 0.86 0.87 -0.07
4 Conclusion
The analysis presented here uses standard solution methods (i.e. linearizing around the steady-
state) but exploits features of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model of business
cycles so that time varying uncertainty can be analyzed. Our measure of time varying uncer-
tainty is dierent than that of DLS as we introduce additional heterogeneity in the entrepreneur
section and treating the fraction of agent types as time-varying so that the eects of time-varying
uncertainty manifest through bank lending and investment activity. While development of more
general solution methods that capture second moments eects is encouraged, we think that the
intuitive nature of this model and its standard solution method make it an attractive environment
to study the eects of time-varying uncertainty.
Our primary ndings fall into two broad categories. First, as in DLS, we also demonstrate that
time varying uncertainty results in countercyclical bankruptcy rates - a nding which is consistent
10 For this comparative analysis, the standard deviation of the innovation to both shocks was assumed to be
0:007: This gure is typical for total factor productivity shocks but whether this is a good gure for shocks to
the second moments is an open question. We also assumed that both shocks exhibit high persistence with an
autocorrelation of 0.95 for t and 0.90 for ! .
11 Both the aggregate production technology shock (t) and the shock to the fraction of risky rms (ut) are
included in both economies.
12 The US gures are from 1947q1 to 2009q4.
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with the data and opposite the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Second, we show that
the uncertainty aects both quantitatively and qualitatively the behavior of the economy. More
specically, the quantitatively impact of an increase is signicantly more than that of an aggregate
technology shock for the risk premium and bankruptcy rate. Quantitative eects of changes in
uncertainty (even with the skewness and kurtosis), however, on the aggregate variables are still
small. Although we believe that the characterization of uncertainty shocks (i.e., second moments
or rare catastrophic events) and the development of richer theoretical models which introduce
more non-linearities in the equations dening equilibrium is in need for future research, we also
believe that our measure of uncertainty does shed light into the quantitative issues that have been
discussed in the recent literature.
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5 Appendix:
5.1 Model Description
5.1.1 Households
The representative household is innitely lived and has expected utility over consumption ct and
leisure 1  lt with functional form given by:
E0
1P
t=0
t [ln (ct) +  (1  lt)] (28)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator on time zero information,  2 (0; 1) ;  > 0;
and lt is time t labor. The household supplies labor, lt; and rents its accumulated capital stock, kt;
to rms at the market clearing real wage, wt; and rental rate rt; respectively, thus earning a total
income of wtlt+ rtkt: The household then purchases consumption good from rms at price of one
(i.e. consumption is the numeraire), and purchases new capital, it; at a price of qt: Consequently,
the household's budget constraint is
wtlt + rtkt  ct + qtit (29)
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The law of motion for households' capital stock is standard:
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it (30)
where  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate on capital.
The necessary conditions associated with the maximization problem include the standard labor-
leisure condition and the intertemporal eciency condition associated with investment. Given
the functional form for preferences, these are:
ct = wt (31)
qt
ct
= Et

qt+1 (1  ) + rt+1
ct+1

(32)
5.1.2 Firms
The economy's output is produced by rms using Cobb-Douglas technology13
Yt = tK
K
t H
H
t (H
e
t )
He (33)
where Yt represents the aggregate output, t denotes the aggregate technology shock, Kt denotes
the aggregate capital stock, Ht denotes the aggregate household labor supply, H
e
t denotes the
aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor, and K + H + He = 1:
14
The prot maximizing representative rm's rst order conditions are given by the factor mar-
13 Note that we denote aggregate variables with upper case while lower case represents per-capita values. Prices
are also lower case.
14 As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, we assume that the entrepreneur's labor share is small, in particular, He = 0:0001.
The inclusion of entrepreneurs' labor into the aggregate production function serves as a technical device so that
entrepreneurs' net worth is always positive, even when insolvent.
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ket's condition that wage and rental rates are equal to their respective marginal productivities:
wt = H
Yt
Ht
(34)
rt = K
Yt
Kt
(35)
wet = He
Yt
Het
(36)
where wet denotes the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor.
5.1.3 Entrepreneurs
A risk neutral representative entrepreneur's course of action is as follows. To nance his project at
period t, he borrows resources from the Capital Mutual Fund according to the optimal nancial
contract. The entire borrowed resources, along with his total net worth at period t, are then
invested into his capital creation project. If the representative entrepreneur is solvent after ob-
serving his own technology shock, he then makes his consumption decision; otherwise, he declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored (at a cost) by the Capital Mutual Fund.
5.2 Entrepreneur's Consumption Choice
To rule out self-nancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the household.
This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
1P
t=0
()
t
cet (37)
where cet denotes entrepreneur's consumption at date t; and  2 (0; 1) : This new parameter, , will
be chosen so that it osets the steady-state internal rate of return to entrepreneurs' investment.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneur nances consumption out of the returns from the
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investment project implying that the law of motion for the entrepreneur's capital stock is:
zt+1 = nt

fm (!t; pt)
1  qtgm (!t; pt)

 
cet
qt
(38)
Note that the expected return to internal fund is
qtfm(!;!;t)it
nt
; that is, the net worth of size
nt is leveraged into a project of size it, entrepreneurs keep the share of the capital produced and
capital is priced at qt consumption goods. Since these are intra-period loans, the opportunity cost
is 1.15
Consequently, the representative entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function in equa-
tion (37) over consumption and capital subject to the law of motion for capital, equation (38),
and the denition of net worth given in equation (3). The resulting Euler equation is as follows:
qt = Et

(qt+1 (1  ) + rt+1)

qt+1fm (!t; pt)
(1  qt+1gm (!t; pt))

5.3 Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral nancial intermediaries who earn no prot
and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in this
economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital production can be eliminated.
The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell un-depreciated capital in advance
of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital through loan repayment
and through monitoring of insolvent rms, and, nally, those entrepreneur's that are still solvent,
sell some of their capital to the CMF to nance current period consumption. This capital is then
sold at the price of qt units of consumption to households for their investment plans.
15 As noted above, we require in steady-state 1 = 
qtfm(!t)
(1 qtgm(!t))
:
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5.4 Steady-state conditions in the Carlstrom and Fuerst Agency Cost
Model
We rst present the equilibrium conditions and express these in scaled (by the fraction of en-
trepreneurs in the economy) terms. Then the equations are analyzed for steady-state implications.
As in the text, upper case variables denote aggregate wide while lower case represent household
variables. Preferences and technology are:
U (~c; 1  l) = ln ~c+  (1  l)
Y = K [(1  ) l]
1  

Where  denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and  is the technology shock.
Note that aggregate household labor is L = (1  ) l while entrepreneurs inelastically supply one
unit of labor. We assume that the share of entrepreneur's labor is approximately zero so that the
production function is simply
Y = K [(1  ) l]
1 
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs receive no wage income (see eq. (9) in C&F.
There are nine equilibrium conditions:
The resource constraint
(1  ) ~ct + c
e
t + it = Yt = tK

t [(1  ) lt]
1 
(39)
Let c = (1 )~c

, h = (1 )

l, and kt =
Kt

then eq(39) can be written as:
ct + c
e
t + it = tk

t h
1 
t (40)
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Household's intratemporal eciency condition
~ct =
(1  )

Kt [(1  ) lt]
 
Dening 0 =

1 , this can be expressed as:
0ct = (1  ) k

t h
 
t (41)
Law of motion of aggregate capital stock
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + it [1  m (!t; pt)]
Dividing by  yields the scaled version:
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + it [1  m (!t; pt)] (42)
Household's intertemporal eciency condition
qt
1
~ct
= Et

1
~ct+1
h
qt+1 (1  ) + t+1K
 1
t+1 [(1  ) lt+1]
1 
i
Dividing both sides by 1 

and scaling the inputs by  yields:
qt
1
ct
= Et

1
ct+1

qt+1 (1  ) + t+1k
 1
t+1 h
1 
t+1

(43)
The conditions from the nancial contract are already in scaled form:
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Contract eciency condition
qt =
1
1  m (!t; pt)+
m(!;pt)fm(!t;pt)
@fm(!t;pt)
@!
(44)
Contract incentive compatibility constraint
it
nt
=
1
1  qtgm (!; pt)
(45)
Where nt is entrepreneur's net worth.
Determination of net worth
nt = Zt
h
qt (1  ) + tK
 1
t [(1  ) lt]
1 
i
or, in scaled terms:
nt = zt

qt (1  ) + tk
 1
t h
1 
t

(46)
Note that zt denotes (scaled) entrepreneur's capital.
Law of motion of entrepreneur's capital
Zt+1 = nt

fm (!; pt)
1  qtgm (!; pt)

  
cet
qt
Or, dividing by 
zt+1 = nt

fm (!; pt)
1  qtgm (!; pt)

 
cet
qt
(47)
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Entrepreneur's intertemporal eciency condition
qt = Et
h
qt+1 (1  ) + t+1K
 1
t+1 [(1  ) lt+1]
1 
i qt+1fm (!; pt)
1  qt+1gm (!; pt)

Or, in scaled terms:
qt = Et

qt+1 (1  ) + t+1k
 1
t+1 h
1 
t+1
 qt+1fm (!; pt)
1  qt+1gm (!; pt)

(48)
5.5 Denition of Steady-state
Steady-state is dened by time-invariant quantities:
ct = c^; c
e
t = c^
e; kt = k^; !t = !^; ht = h^; qt = q^; zt = z^; nt = n^; it = {^
So there are nine unknowns. While we have nine equilibrium conditions, the two intertemporal
eciency conditions become identical in steady-state since C&F impose the condition that the
internal rate of return to entrepreneur is oset by their additional discount factor:


q^fm (!^; p)
1  q^gm (!^; p)

= 1 (49)
This results in an indeterminacy - but there is a block recursiveness of the model due to the
calibration exercise. In particular, we demonstrate that the risk premium and bankruptcy rate
determine (!^; ) - these in turn determine the steady-state price of capital. From eq.(43)we have:
q^ =

1   (1  )
k^ 1h^1  =

1   (1  )
y^
k^
(50)
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From eq.(41)we have:
h^ =
1  
0
k^h^1 
c^
=
1  
0
y^
c^
(51)
From eq.(42)we have:
k^ =
1  m (!^; p)

{^ (52)
Note that these three equations are normally (i.e. in a typical RBC framework) used to nd
steady-state

k^; h^; c^

- because q^ = 1. Here since the price of capital is endogenous, we have four
unknowns. From eq. (46)and eq. (43)we have
n^ = z^

q^ (1  ) + 
y^
k^

= z^
q^

(53)
From eq. (47)and the restriction on the entrepreneur's additional discount factor (eq. (49)), we
have
z^ = n^
1
q^
 
c^e
q^
(54)
Combining eqs. (53)and (54) yields:
c^e
n^
=
1

   (55)
We have the two conditions from the nancial contract
q^ =
1
1  m (!^; p)+ m (!^; p)
fm(!^;p)
@fm(!^;p)
@!^
(56)
And
{^ =
1
1  q^ (1  m (!^; p)  fm (!^; p))
n^ (57)
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Finally, we have the resource constraint:
c^+ c^e + {^ = k^h^1  (58)
The eight equations (50) ; (51) ; (52) ; (53) ; (54) ; (56) ; (57) ; (58) are insucient to nd the nine
unknowns. However, the risk premium, denoted as , is dened by the following
q^!^
{^
{^  n^
=  (59)
But we also know (from eq.(57) that
n^
{^
= 1  q^gm (!^; p)
Rearranging eq.(59) yields:
q^!^

= 1 
n^
{^
substituting from the previous expression yields
!^ = gm (!^; p) (60)
Let br = bankruptcy rate { this observable also provides another condition on the distribution.
That is, we require:
m (!^; p) = br (61)
The two equations eq.(60) and eq. (61) can be solved for the two unknowns - (!^; ). Note that
the price of capital in steady-state, is a function of (!^; ) as determined by eq. (56). The other
preference parameter,  is then determined by eq. (49). Once this is determined, the remaining
unknowns:

c^; c^e; h^; {^; k^; z^; n^

are determined by eqs. (50) ; (51) ; (52) ; (53) ; (55) ; (57) ; (58).
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Finally, we note that the parameter  does not play a role in the characteristics of equilibrium
and, in particular, the behavior of aggregate consumption. This can be seen by rst dening
aggregate consumption:
(1  ) ~ct + c
e
t = C
A
t
Dividing by  and using the earlier denitions:
ct + c
e
t = c
A
t (62)
Since the policy rules for household and entrepreneurial consumption are dened as the per-
centage deviations from steady-state, aggregate consumption will be similarly dened (and note
that since cAt =
1

CAt ;percentage deviations of aggregate consumption and scaled aggregate con-
sumption are identical). Using an asterisk to denote percentage deviations from steady-state, we
have:
c^
c^+ c^e
ct +
c^e
c^+ c^e
cet = c
A
t (63)
It is this equation that is used to analyze the cyclical properties of aggregate consumption.
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